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Parallel Developments and Discrepancies
It was not quite uncommon in both the 19th and 20th century to declare that 
geography determines significantly the destiny of a state and the political 
interplay of superpowers (both global and regional ones) is likely to produce 
the final result of international relations at various political and economic 
levels. The concepts by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford John Mackinder, 
Karl Haushofer, Alexander Prokofiev Seversky or Saul Cohen to name but 
a few have contributed to creating various regional or global strategies with 
a higher or lower potential for practical implementation. This may have 
had tragic or even barbarian implications, but generally, the philosophy of 
geopolitical studies has always had a growing number of takers, not all of 
them full of evil intentions. At the beginning of our millennium the world 
according to Thomas Friedman was to become really ‘flat’ and globally 
interconnected so the theories conceived much earlier could be thought of 
as obsolete and therefore non-applicable to our deeply transformed reality. 
However, very soon in the 21st century politicians and businesspeople alike 
realized that the world might be flat in some places but others would remain 
not flat at all, and even the number of these ‘flat areas’ is likely to shrink 
owing to the dynamic changes that were not earlier anticipated.111 In other 
words, as Robert Kaplan puts it, we are ready to experience ‘The Revenge 
of Geography.’112 The philosophy of Realpolitik, deeply immersed in its own 
reality of geographical, historical, social and cultural facts, might go through 
the process of re-thinking but it is likely to stay where it was before, probably 
with some modifications only.113
111 See: Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: a Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2005.
112 See: Robert Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, Random House, New York, 2013.
113 On the issue of Realpolitik in the context of Nepal and South Asia see my text in 
Politeja,2015 (in print).
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REALPOLITIK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL EU POLICIES
It is definitely worth stating that the debates on the recent interpretations 
of the changing concepts of political geography are more applicable to the 
selected regions of Eastern and Central Europe, Central Asia (mostly post-
Soviet States), and extended Middle East than to the areas of South or East 
Asia where they may have quite limited relevance. Moreover, it should be 
stressed that the political and social transformations in the Middle East do not 
have only the local implications but these are likely to extend to the borders 
of the European Union, crossing them into various directions. Therefore, the 
European geostrategic outlook has to be strongly linked with the area of the 
Middle East and the necessity to build up strategic partnership with a few 
selected partners has become one of the iron pillars in the EU diplomacy. The 
Revenge of Geography has become a deeply-felt challenge especially after 
the so-called Arab Spring but its consequences are not the only determinants 
of the EU foreign policy or active policies pursued by some Member States 
in the Middle East. 
Geostrategic shifts in the recent years have their own significance but these 
cannot fully overshadow the political/cultural values and human rights agenda 
which have always been on the EU radar in the process of strengthening or 
loosening ties with its partners worldwide. Although that could be considered 
as counter-productive in the context of the Realpolitik being implemented 
by other countries this value-laden diplomatic attitude is likely to bring good 
benefits in a long-term perspective, as it was the case in Central and Eastern 
Europe by the end of the 1980s. In a short-term perspective, that kind of 
policy based on democratic values, propagated globally, may be perceived as 
utterly naïve but the much deeper insight will allow the external observers to 
discover the fact that the classical Realpolitik devoid of any ethical substance 
usually generates some short-term gains for a state but in a longer perspective 
the same state is likely to lose, both at home and in its international relations. 
This was the case with the former Soviet Union or Nazi Germany as both 
of them were the hot proponents of pure Realpolitik which totally failed, 
tragically having caused the death of millions of people. The European Union, 
with its well-known ups and downs, has still its own firm international agenda 
which, in spite of a global criticism, contributes to a positive image of its 
own. It should be remembered, however, that the European Union and its 
Member States are expected and have to pursue simultaneously the policies 
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founded on two pillars: the one rooted in the clear system of European values 
and the other which props the platform of geostrategic realities. The policy 
based only on the first pillar would be totally idealistic without a chance to 
succeed in a long-term perspective whilst the policy based on the second 
pillar would only be nihilistic and consequently unacceptable for the human 
rights-sensitive citizens in all the Member States. 
DEMOCRACY VERSUS STABILITY 
On the other side, it ought to be emphasized that a concept of ‘democracy’ is 
not and should not be interpreted precisely in the same way globally and it has 
to be adopted to local conditions and cultural traditions. The transfer of one 
fully-shaped and ideologically rigid political system, workable in a unique 
social and cultural milieu, into a land with a totally different historical and 
religious background may result in political disorder, social chaos and finally 
the disintegration of the country. The most tragic recent example is Iraq 
where the promise of a ‘shortcut to democracy’ made before the American 
intervention, materialized in a gradual disintegration of the former state and 
the establishment of the extremist political entity known under the misleading 
name Daesh, or ISIS - the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. However, one 
cannot forget the fact that the non-interventionist policy in Syria has brought 
about the same tragic consequences, with the disintegration of the country 
and the spread of the extremist ideology of the Daesh. There are no clear-cut 
solutions applicable to various countries with their own historical, cultural 
and geographic complexities. Therefore, in their geostrategic policies towards 
the Middle East the EU Member States should carefully design not only their 
own priorities but should also take into account the priorities of the targeted 
countries. The concepts of a ‘balanced stability,’ ‘gradual nation-building’ or 
the ‘rule of law’ do have their own material equivalents in the real political 
world (and can be valued more than the idea of ‘democracy’). These may 
and do differ globally but the priorities remain the same for responsible 
political players: the reduction of violence and the avoidance of bloodshed. 
These priorities fit well into the ethical framework of the EU Realpolitik, 
however the methods to implement them in various parts of the world 
might be deemed disputable under certain conditions. 
A good example on the perception of ‘democracy’ comes from Tunisia, which 
in many Western countries has been regarded as ‘the most successful state’ 
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in the process of democratic transition after the Arab Spring. According to 
the Pew Research Center Tunisian support for democracy declined steeply in 
2014 as compared to the early days of the Arab Spring. Just 48% of Tunisians 
believed that democracy was preferable to other kinds of government, down 
from 63% in a 2012 poll conducted only months after the uprising removed 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from office.
Similarly, when asked whether a democratic government or a leader with 
a strong hand could best solve the country’s problems, only 38% choose 
the former, down from 61% two years ago. Meanwhile, the share of the 
public favoring a strong leader has risen from 37% to 59%. Still, despite 
waning confidence in democracy’s ability to produce results, Tunisians 
continue to want key features of a democratic system, such as a a fair 
judiciary, competitive elections, the right to protest and equal rights for men 
and women.114 The public’s discontent could result from a poor economic 
situation but that probably would only be a part of the explanation. 
Impatient voters might expect to see the immediate benefits of any kind 
after a revolution which has ousted the previous regime and democracy is 
usually considered to be the best tool to this end. Unfortunately, building 
all the democratic structures, institutions and traditions is generally a time-
consuming process that requires a big dose of patience and a great deal of 
compromise among all the players in the country. Any political ‘shortcuts’ 
in the democratic process may appear to be tempting but they usually end 
up in another authoritarian regime taking over. Given its own geostrategic 
backgrounds, historical developments and cultural values every country 
ought to have its own version of the political system which can guarantee 
stability, the rule of law and the minimum prosperity for its citizens. It is hard 
to define one universal political system that fits everywhere. The realities of 
the 21st century world force us to compromise on the workable and optimal 
solutions which, unfortunately, could be regarded as ‘disappointing’ by a 
part of the public opinion in Europe or in Arab countries, but the idea of 
‘geostrategic compromise’ in the real, not in the ideal world, must always 
be a viable option at our disposal.
114 See the reports by Pew Research Center: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/15/tunisian-
confidence-in-democracy-wanes/, [(retrieved on 24th May 24, 2015)]
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THE POLE OF STABILITY. JORDAN AS A STRATEGIC EU 
PARTNER IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
It comes as no surprise that it is Jordan who plays a very important role in 
the EU foreign policy in the Middle East. In fact, the country should be and 
definitely is perceived as a strong pole of stability in a relatively volatile 
region and that high opinion is attested by an advanced status partnership, 
officially signed in 2010. According to the EU diplomacy, Jordan ‘continues 
to exert a stabilizing and moderating role in a difficult regional environment 
while pursuing efforts to strengthen democracy and rule of law.’ Naturally, it 
is the EU’s objective to support Jordan in all of these endeavors. The current 
agenda of EU-Jordan relations is laid out in an Action Plan under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the legal basis for the EU-Jordan relationship 
is the Association Agreement which entered into force on 1 May 2002.115 
Geostrategic realities, especially the situation in Syria and Iraq, highlight the 
role of stabilizing factors in the Middle East and definitely, Jordan’s position 
in this context is likely to grow in the near future. It is especially very clear 
for the US government that has its own vital interests in the whole region. 
Robert Satloff and David Schenker from the Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy present their own recommendations for the President Obama and 
his administration. The authors assume that Jordan’s geostrategic location in 
a volatile environment might have a significant impact on its perception of 
security and domestic situation. Their views are probably shared by the US 
Department of State:
Syria - both in its current state of civil war and in the post-Assad era - will pose 
a substantial threat to Jordanian security, one that rivals or even surpasses 
the heightened operational tempo of al-Qaeda in Jordan following the US 
invasion in Iraq. The spread of radical ideologies from Islamist groups in 
Syria, an influx of violent jihadists, the threat of cross-border terrorism, and 
trade in sophisticated weapons will erode Jordan’s internal stability. In order 
to help Jordan address this range of threats and insulate its internal politics 
from the developments in Syria, the United States could increase its already 
strong intelligence sharing and cooperation with Jordan. However, it should 
work with Jordan quietly. Whatever additional deterrence is created vis-à-
vis Syria by advertising US-Jordanian military and intelligence cooperation, 
115 See: The EU’s Relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, http://eeas.europa.eu/
jordan/index_en.htm, ([retrieved on 23rd May 23, 2015]) 
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including the deployment of US forces to prepare for contingencies, is offset 
by inflaming local passions that could ignite if circumstances worsen.
The United States has important interests at stake in Jordan and should take 
steps to lower the likelihood of major threats to Jordan’s stability emerging 
in the near future. The most urgent factor contributing to instability in Jordan 
is financial; the IMF recently reported that Jordan’s midterm fiscal situation 
appears positive, but to get to the ‘midterm,’ especially if the regional security 
situation worsens, Jordan needs help. At the same time, Jordan cannot be 
insulated from the deepening crisis in Syria but it can be protected from its 
most negative repercussions.116
The US and EU perceptions of the Middle East may vary in some points 
but both players are interested in strongly supporting Jordan in its efforts to 
stabilize the neighbourhood. At present, it is hardly possible to predict the future 
development of the whole area of the Middle East but the task of identifying 
the most reliable regional stakeholders appears to be relatively easy. The 
moderating Amman’s policy is a natural choice for the global players so the 
European Union is quite comfortable with its partnership with Jordan. Although 
the Middle East strategies and the visions of Washington and Brussels have their 
own significance it is the self-perception of its own policy-making that matters 
most for every country and Jordan is no exception. In the official Jordanian 
documents on the political strategy both at home and abroad the objectives for 
the policymakers are stated very clearly and these are well understood by the 
EU diplomats and their counterparts in the Member States. The philosophy of 
the government must be deeply rooted in the geostrategic ground reality:
As a small state with limited resources, the primary concern of Jordanian 
policymakers must be to safeguard the country’s immediate national interests. 
However, the Hashemite leadership has concurrently pursued a number 
of grand strategic objectives designed to revitalize the Arab world and the 
Middle East. Jordan’s geostrategic outlook can therefore best be described 
as operating on two distinct yet sometimes interacting levels. The first 
involves activities, behavior and decisions that are related to the immediate 
welfare and survival of the country. The second track is a long-term activist 
orientation designed to spur a renewal of Arab energies and promote the 
overall well-being of the Middle East.
116 Robert Satloff, David Schenker, Political Instability in Jordan,  http://www.cfr.org/jor-
dan/political-instability-jordan/p30698,  ( retrieved on May 22, 2015). 
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The idea of unity is a powerful and emotive political imperative within the 
Arab world, as Arabs share a common language, culture and much of the 
same historical background. In respect to the promotion of Arab unity, 
Jordan represents what can be termed the ‘federal’ school of thought, long 
espoused by the Hashemites. The main viewpoint of this school is that the Arab 
countries, especially in Asia, should organize politically along federal lines. 
Jordan and other members of the ‘federal’ school have pursued a moderate 
approach aimed at creating and strengthening true bonds of cooperation 
between Arab states.
The Hashemite commitment to Arab unity has been demonstrated repeatedly. 
Sharif Hussein led the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire after 
having been promised a unified state for the Arabs. After the conclusion of 
World War I, however, separatist forces and local Arab chieftains colluded 
with Britain and France to impose the confederal state system against the 
will of the majority of the Arab populace. The confederal scheme was later 
institutionalized in 1945 by the adoption of the Charter of the League of Arab 
States, and it remains in effect today.117
From the European perspective, the Jordanian geostrategic outlook combining 
two fundamental objectives is much better appreciated at present than 30 or 
40 years ago. To safeguard its own national interests the country should be 
constantly involved in an active policy towards the Arab unity and that is 
reflected in the above-stated concept of the ‘federal approach.’ Strengthening 
the bonds of effective cooperation between the Arab states guarantees the 
minimum stability which is the condition for the future prosperity of the whole 
Arab world. The colliding interests of several Arab states and the objectives of 
the non-state actors are the main obstacles in the process of building the unity 
but these are - as I believe - the natural determinants of the recent phenomenon 
of the ‘Revenge of Geography and History.’ Within the European Union this 
collision of separate interests of its Member States with the desire to gradually 
build the European unity is being experienced quite painfully, especially in 
the situation of geostrategic challenges and threats coming from the South 
(the influx of immigrants escaping the persecution and poverty at home) and 
from the East (after the Russian invasion on Crimea and the violent foreign 
policy of Moscow). The EU concept of unity of values in diversity of cultures 
117 See the official website of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan http://www.kinghussein.
gov.jo/f_affairs2.html#The Arab Political Order: Confederal vs. Federal, (retrieved on May 
22, 2015).
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is being seriously tested. Almost every Member State has to pursue its own 
policies on two distinct yet interacting levels, in a quite similar manner as 
Jordan does, so generally the idea of the ‘federal policy’ is closely linked 
with the policy of addressing the domestic challenges. Both policies are more 
and more inseparable as geostrategic challenges by definition cross all the 
national borders so they cannot be tackled by the national governments only. 
The European strategists should therefore understand and correctly interpret 
the realities of the Middle East and the Jordanian perspective of pursuing its 
complex policy.
POLAND AS AN EASTERN PILLAR OF THE EU POLICY
Poland became a fully sovereign state in 1989 after the first free (or semi-free) 
elections when the process of political, social and economic transformation 
started. It must be stressed that the transformation from a Soviet centrally-
planned economy to a free-market economy was very painful and it was 
made more so by the devastating condition of the Polish economy in 1989. 
The new government inherited vast debts, a burdensome welfare system that 
could not cope with the demands placed on it and inflation of 586 per cent. 
The Soviet-era flagship industries such as steel and shipbuilding were not 
only unable to pull the economy out of the crisis; they were wasting the 
remaining funds. The bold yet socially controversial moves initiated by a 
new non-Communist government to put the economy on the right track have 
been fully analyzed and commented over the years so it is sufficient to say 
that 10 years later the private sector accounted for over three-quarters of the 
GDP and in 2002 inflation was brought down to 3 per cent. The international 
environment in 1989 was not promising at all for the new government and the 
old psychological scars and injuries, deeply rooted in history (or at least in 
some interpretations of history) could not be easily healed. Adam Zamoyski, 
an Anglo-Polish historian, refers to the hot days of the transformation in the 
context of Poland’s diplomatic activities in his book ‘A History of Poland:’
No formula for adopting any form of violence could be approved of. That sort 
of new foreign policy, or better said: philosophy of modern foreign policy, 
conceived by intellectuals-turned into-politicians, was translated into reality 
soon after the first non-communist government took over in 1989. So, within 
weeks of its formation, the then Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski 
opened up relations with the Soviet republics of Lithuania, Belarus and 
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Ukraine, as if they were sovereign states. With all of them Poland had had 
more or less strained relations due to very complex historical issues, expressed 
demands of territorial revision or the status of minorities - Polish minorities 
living in those countries or respective minorities living in Poland. That was a 
very bold move, taken two years before the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 
a very hot political atmosphere Minister Skubiszewski declared that Poland 
would never seek to revise her frontier with Lithuania and did not consider 
Polish residents in that country to be anything other than Lithuanian citizens. 
The same formula was applied towards other mentioned countries and it was 
in stark contrast to the political concepts displayed elsewhere.   
At that time Poland’s relations with the Soviet Union were bound to be strained 
as there were large bodies of Soviet troops stationed in Poland - which finally 
left in 1993 - and Moscow was still hoping to keep the country within its 
sphere of interest. The break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked a turning 
point as Poland was the first country to recognize Ukraine’s declaration 
of independence, and the second to recognize Lithuania. A bit earlier in 
February 1990 the then president Lech Wałęsa met presidents Vaclav Havel 
of former Czechoslovakia and Jozsef Antall of Hungary in VysehradVisegrad, 
in Prague, where they reached a tripartite agreement to provide a framework 
for united action and regional security. (Right now it is, of course, a group of 
four: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - PK).
Polish diplomacy faced a no less delicate subject as it opened relations with 
Germany. In 1945 Poland had acquired, by Stalin’s order and the Western 
Allies’ agreement a big area of former German territory in the West, having 
lost even bigger portion of her own territory on the East to the then Soviet 
Union (…) Poland demanded formal ratification of its western border, 
reminding all concerned that, when signing agreements with Lithuania, 
Belarus and Ukraine, it had declared its unconditional recognition of existing 
borders and its refusal to encourage any claims by minorities either within 
these countries or ousted from them. This argument was accepted and with 
the support of the United States the existing borders were finally confirmed.118
In fact, our relations with Germany have become very cordial since that time 
and the German government has offered Poland great support in the efforts to 
join the European Union. At present, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
118 Adam Zamoyski, Poland. A History, Harper Press, London 2009, p. 399-401
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is ready to cooperate fully with the Polish government on the crisis in Ukraine, 
despite strong protests of several groups of German entrepreneurs interested 
in maintaining business-as-usual relations with Moscow.
Poland submitted an application for the EU membership in 1994 and was 
formally admitted on 1 May 2004. A no less significant date for many Poles 
was 12 March 1999 when the country joined NATO along with Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, as this act finally cancelled the Yalta Agreement 
which had made Poland a semi-dependent country under the control of the 
Soviets. Majority of Poles interpreted the fact of becoming a NATO member 
in terms of obtaining a secure position which could guarantee the country’s 
sovereignty. At the same time, Poles started to consider our geographical 
location not as a threat but as a chance to build stable and rational, however 
not always very friendly, relations with our neighbours. It should be reminded 
here that the number of our neighbours increased: in 1989 we had only three: 
the USSR, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. At present none of these exist. 
We share our border with seven countries: Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia. In fact, the geostrategic 
location has always been a challenge for Poland. The problem, of course, is 
that it is very difficult to deal with neighbours. Friends can come and go, but 
neighbours stay. Neighbours, especially the hostile and difficult ones require 
engagement so foreign policy should be the framework to decide the terms of 
that engagement. An interesting analysis on Poland’s geostrategic challenges 
in this context has been presented by an external observer, George Friedman 
from the American Institute at Stratford: 
Polish national strategy pivots around a single, existential issue: how to 
preserve its national identity and independence. Located on the oft-invaded 
North European Plain, Poland’s existence is heavily susceptible to the 
moves of major Eurasian powers. (…) For some countries, geopolitics is a 
marginal issue. Win or lose, life goes on. But for Poland, geopolitics is an 
existential issue; losing begets national catastrophe. Therefore, Poland’s 
national strategy inevitably is designed with an underlying sense of fear 
and desperation. Nothing in Polish history would indicate that disaster is 
impossible.
Obviously, close ties with NATO and the European Union are Poland’s first 
strategic solution, but the viability of NATO as a military force is less than 
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clear and the future of the European Union is clouded. This is at the heart 
of Poland’s strategic problem. (…) Poland has three strategies available 
to it. The first is to do everything it can to keep NATO and the European 
Union viable and Germany contained within them. Poland doesn’t have the 
power to ensure this. The second is to create a relationship with Germany 
or Russia that guarantees its interests. Obviously, the ability to maintain 
those relationships is limited. The third strategy is to find an outside power 
prepared to guarantee its interests.
That power is currently the United States. But the United States, after the 
experiences in the Islamic world, is moving toward a more distant, balance-
of-power approach to the world. This does not mean the United States is 
indifferent to what happens in northern Europe. The growth of Russian power 
and potential Russian expansionism that would upset the European balance 
of power obviously would not be in Washington’s interest. But as the United 
States matures as a global power, it will allow the regional balance of power 
to stabilize naturally rather than intervene if the threat appears manageable.119
It is not difficult to predict that under these circumstances Poland has to act 
on two (or three) separate yet interacting levels. The bilateral ties with its 
Eastern neighbours (which are not the Member States) are built with an active 
participation of the European Union. This strategy enables Poland to exert 
an effective impact on Russian policy towards Ukraine that depends heavily 
on external support, both in political and economic areas. EU is hardly ever 
depicted by the most influential Russian media as a united political entity 
with its own global agenda and a cohesive philosophy of action. This media-
popularized message is strengthened by the ‘pragmatic-Realpolitik approach’ 
of the Russian diplomacy that is more inclined to build up and develop the 
bilateral relations with a selected group of the Member States than to deal in 
the overall manner with the EU institutions. Therefore, it is a deep concern of 
Poland to promote the philosophy of playing in a team, i.e. in the EU team in 
order to become more efficient in its dealings with the Russian government. 
The same philosophy may be applied elsewhere as the EU 2020 strategy 
emphasizes the interdependence of the various EU policies and the policies 
pursued by the Member States. The stability and prosperity of the Eastern 
and Central parts of Europe depends on the integrated and cohesive EU 
activities being in harmony with the policies of the most influential Member 
119 George Friedman, Poland’s Strategy (in:) Geopolitical Weekly, August 28, 2012, https://
www.stratfor.com/weekly/polands-strategy (retrieved on May 25, 2015).
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States, especially Germany and France. Poland is a strong proponent of 
these interdependent policies and its solid position on the Eastern European 
flank will strengthen the overall position of the European Union in this part 
of the world. At the same time, Poland believes in what is guaranteed by 
our membership in NATO. From the purely geostrategic perspective any 
form of Russian expansionism would upset the balance of power in Europe 
and that consequently would not be in Washington’s interest. This simple 
observation should be considered a pragmatic approach towards Realpolitik 
which coexists side-by-side with the ethical substance of the EU policies. 
These policies cannot be efficient without applying the principle of power in 
the most extreme circumstances. Every Polish government should be fully 
aware of all these interdependencies.
CONCLUSION
It may appear to be a bold overstatement but both Poland and Jordan have 
quite similar roles to play in their respective political environments. Their 
sovereignty and national security depend not only on their respective home 
policies but also, to a great degree, on the geopolitical realities. Russian 
expansionist policies and the Ukrainian crisis pose a serious threat to Poland 
and - in a parallel manner - the extremist activities of Daesh in the Middle 
East plus the devastating war in Syria are the most serious threats looming 
over Jordan. Both countries have to pursue their policies on several separate 
yet interacting levels and both have been considered for quite a long time 
the pillars of regional stability. Poland and Jordan depend greatly, whether 
they like it or not, on external powers that may influence their domestic or 
international activities. The time has come for both, Jordan and Poland, to 
develop much deeper interest in the crucial areas of the Middle East and 
Central-Eastern Europe respectively, as many of the regional events, however 
distinct they may appear, are becoming more and more interlinked.
Amman, May 31, 2015
